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STANDARDIZING PROCEDURAL NORMS OF 
THE ICC THROUGH AL BASHIR 
David F. Crowley-Buck* 
Abstract: On March 4, 2009, the International Criminal Court issued its 
first ever arrest warrant against a sitting head of state, Omar Hassan Ah-
mad Al Bashir. The warrant, issued in relation to the situation in the Dar-
fur region of Sudan, was notable both for its inclusion of charges of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity, and for its exclusion of charges of 
genocide. On appeal, the decision not to include the genocide charges in 
the warrant was unanimously overruled for an error in law regarding the 
standard of proof utilized to determine the sufficiency of mens rea. The 
International Criminal Court is the only permanent international adjudi-
catory body tasked with the criminal adjudication of individuals accused 
of the most serious crimes of international concern. In overruling this 
decision, therefore, the International Criminal Court not only standard-
ized the evidentiary thresholds for the prosecution of genocide charges in 
its Chambers, but at the same time distinguished itself among the grow-
ing field of international adjudicatory bodies. 
Introduction 
 On March 4, 2009, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued 
an arrest warrant against the sitting president of the Republic of Sudan, 
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Al Bashir).1 The warrant, the first ever 
issued by the ICC against a sitting head of state, listed five counts of 
crimes against humanity and two counts of war crimes relating to the 
armed conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan.2 The warrant did not, 
however, list the three counts of genocide alleged by the Office of the 
                                                                                                                      
* David F. Crowley-Buck is a Staff Writer for the Boston College International & Compara-
tive Law Review. 
1 See Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Al Bashir I ), Case No. ICC-02/05–
01/09, Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 8 (Mar. 4, 2009), http:// 
www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc639078.pdf. 
2 See id. at 7–8; Xan Rice, Sudanese President Bashir Charged with Darfur War Crimes, Guard-
ian (London), Mar. 5, 2009, at 4, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/mar/ 
04/omar-bashir-sudan-president-arrest. 
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Prosecutor of the ICC.3 On February 3, 2010, the Appeals Chamber of 
the ICC reversed this decision with respect to the genocide charges, 
citing the Pre-Trial Chamber’s use of an erroneous standard of proof 
regarding the sufficiency of mens rea evidence for allegations of geno-
cide.4 As a relatively new international criminal adjudicatory body, the 
ICC is struggling to assert itself within the increasingly expanding area 
of international law. 5  By handing down this decision, the Appeals 
Chamber simultaneously established itself within the boundaries of in-
ternational criminal adjudication, while at the same time standardizing 
an independent evidentiary procedure by which future genocide alle-
gations will be adjudicated before the ICC.6 
 Part I of this Comment provides a background on Prosecutor v. 
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir and the evidentiary standard utilized by 
the Pre-Trial Chamber I regarding the three counts of genocide. This 
section also discusses the decision of the Appeals Chamber to reverse 
the Pre-Trial Chamber I. Part II focuses on the statutorily prescribed 
evidentiary thresholds of the ICC and the evidentiary thresholds util-
ized by other similarly-structured international criminal tribunals. Part 
III analyzes in more detail the decision of the Appeals Chamber. In par-
ticular, Part III analyzes the role of the Appeals Chamber decision both 
in standardizing the evidentiary thresholds for genocide proceedings 
before the ICC and in asserting the ICC’s significance among the grow-
ing field of international adjudicatory bodies. 
I. Background 
A. Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir: Pre-Trial Chamber I 
Rejects Genocide Charges Against Al Bashir 
 On March 31, 2005, following a report of the International Com-
mission of Inquiry concerning violations of international humanitarian 
law and human rights law in the Darfur region of Sudan, the United 
                                                                                                                      
3 See Al Bashir I, Case No. ICC-02/05–01/09, at 7–8; see also Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan 
Ahmad Al Bashir (Al Bashir II ), Case No. ICC-02/05–01/09, Decision on the Prosecution’s 
Application for a Warrant of Arrest Against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ¶ 110 (Mar. 4, 
2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc639096.pdf. 
4 See Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Al Bashir Appeal ), Case No. ICC-
02/05–01/09, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the “Decision on the 
Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest Against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir,” 
¶ 41 (Feb. 3, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc817795.pdf. 
5 See Robert Cryer, The Definitions of International Crimes in the Al Bashir Arrest Warrant 
Decision, 7 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 283, 295 (2009). 
6 See id. 
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Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1593, which referred the 
matter to the Office of the Prosecutor (Prosecutor) of the ICC.7 On 
July 14, 2008, the Prosecutor filed an application under Article 58 of 
the Rome Statute of the ICC (Rome Statute), requesting the issuance 
of an arrest warrant against Al Bashir for his alleged criminal responsi-
bility in the commission of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 
genocide against members of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa groups in 
Darfur.8 According to Article 58(1)(a) of the Rome Statute, a warrant 
for arrest shall be issued if a Pre-Trial Chamber is satisfied that there 
are “reasonable grounds to believe” that the person committed the 
crime.9 Each of the three judges of the Pre-Trial Chamber I (Pre-Trial 
Chamber) was satisfied that there existed reasonable grounds to believe 
that Al Bashir committed war crimes10 and crimes against humanity.11 
 With respect to the genocide allegations, however, the question of 
the sufficiency of the evidence necessary to fulfill the intent require-
ment of the Rome Statute divided the judges of the Pre-Trial Cham-
ber.12 The two-judge majority (Majority) determined that the crime of 
genocide is comprised of two subjective elements: a general subjective 
element provided for in the Rome Statute and a dolus specialis (“specific 
intent”), which refers to the specific intent to destroy in whole, or in 
                                                                                                                      
7 S.C. Res. 1593, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005). The ICC is not a U.N. 
body, but because the Republic of Sudan is not a signatory to the Rome Statute, jurisdic-
tion had to be conferred upon the ICC by the U.N. Security Council under Article 12 of 
the Rome Statute. See Ruth Mackenzie et al., The Manual on International Courts 
and Tribunals 160 (2d ed. 2010). 
8 Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Al Bashir II ), Case No. ICC-02/05–
01/09, Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest Against Omar 
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ¶ 4 (Mar. 4, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc 
639096.pdf; see Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 58(1), July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force July 1, 2002). The Prosecutor alleged five counts of 
crimes against humanity (murder, extermination, forcible transfer, torture, and rape), two 
counts of war crimes (pillaging and intentionally directing attacks against a civilian popula-
tion as such or against individual civilians not taking part in the hostilities), and three 
counts of genocide (genocide by killing, genocide by causing serious bodily or mental 
harm, and genocide by deliberately inflicting on each target group conditions of life calcu-
lated to bring about the group’s physical destruction). See Al Bashir II, Case No. ICC-02/ 
05–01/09, ¶¶ 78, 109, 110. 
9 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra  note 8, art. 58(1)(a). 
10 Al Bashir II, Case No. ICC-02/05–01/09, ¶ 78. 
11 Id. ¶ 109. 
12 Id. ¶¶ 158–159; Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Al Bashir III ), Case 
No. ICC-02/05–01/09, Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest 
Against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ¶¶ 84–86 (Mar. 4, 2009) (Ušacka, J., separate and 
partly dissenting), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc639096.pdf. 
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part, the targeted group.13 Recognizing that the Prosecutor relied ex-
clusively on proof by inference regarding Al Bashir’s alleged genocidal 
intent, the Majority, citing cases tried before the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR), held that for such an inference to be drawn regarding 
Al Bashir’s dolus specialis, it must be the “only reasonable inference 
available on the evidence.”14 Ultimately, after reviewing the materials 
offered by the Prosecutor, the Majority found that reasonable grounds 
to believe that Al Bashir possessed the requisite genocidal intent was 
not the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the material pre-
sented.15 Accordingly, the Majority refused to issue an arrest warrant for 
the three counts of genocide alleged against Al Bashir.16 
 Judge Anita Ušacka, in her dissent, was satisfied that there were 
reasonable grounds to believe that Al Bashir possessed the requisite 
genocidal intent.17 To support her position, Judge Ušacka pointed to 
the necessity of distinguishing between the progressively higher eviden-
tiary thresholds statutorily required for the three different stages of the 
ICC proceedings: the arrest warrant/summons, the confirmation of 
charges, and the conviction.18 In distinguishing between such thresh-
olds, Judge Ušacka emphasized that references to other international 
bodies, while instructive, were not entirely apt.19 Further, recognizing 
the Majority’s understanding of the particularly difficult nature of de-
termining dolus specialis, and concerned that well-disguised intent not 
be used as a barrier to prosecution, Judge Ušacka argued that the Ma-
jority’s standard essentially required the Prosecutor to prove genocidal 
intent beyond reasonable doubt at the pre-trial stage of the proceed-
ings.20 Under the “reasonable grounds to believe” standard for the issu-
                                                                                                                      
13 Al Bashir II, Case No. ICC-02/05–01/09, ¶ 139. 
14 See id. ¶¶ 147–155, 160. 
15 Id. ¶ 205 (“[T]he Majority cannot but conclude that the existence of reasonable 
grounds to believe that that the [Government of Sudan] acted with a dolus specialis/specific 
intent to destroy in whole or in part the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa groups is not the only 
reasonable conclusion that can be drawn therefrom.”). 
16 Id. ¶ 206. 
17 Al Bashir III, Case No. ICC-02/05–01/09, ¶ 1. 
18 See id. ¶ 8. 
19 See id. ¶ 6 (“In contrast, the factual characterisations or legal conclusions of such 
bodies are drawn from their different mandates, and therefore may be relevant only by 
analogy.”). 
20 See id. ¶ 31 (“[R]equiring the Prosecution to establish that genocidal intent is the 
only reasonable inference available on the evidence is tantamount to requiring the Prose-
 
2011 Standardizing Procedural Norms of the ICC Through Al Bashir 19 
ance of an arrest warrant, Judge Ušacka argued that the Pre-Trial 
Chamber need only determine whether genocide is a reasonable infer-
ence available on the evidence presented, not the only reasonable in-
ference available.21 
B. Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir: Appeals Chamber 
Reverses Decision Citing an Erroneous Standard of Proof 
 On appeal, the Prosecutor argued that the Majority utilized an in-
correct standard of proof to determine the sufficiency of the mens rea 
component of the genocide charges.22 Specifically, the Prosecutor em-
phasized the failure of the Pre-Trial Chamber to adhere to the three 
distinct standards of proof outlined by the Rome Statute23 and the in-
consistency of the decision when compared to previous decisions of the 
Pre-Trial Chamber and the ad hoc international criminal tribunals.24 On 
February 3, 2010, the Appeals Chamber unanimously reversed the de-
cision of the Pre-Trial Chamber with respect to the three counts of ge-
nocide, citing an error of law.25 The Appeals Chamber recognized the 
distinction between the three statutorily prescribed standards of proof 
and further noted that “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” (the stan-
dard essentially put forth by the Pre-Trial Chamber’s “only reasonable 
conclusion” analysis) clearly requires more than what is required by 
“reasonable grounds to believe” (the standard prescribed in the Rome 
Statute).26 The Appeals Chamber recognized that the “only reasonable 
                                                                                                                      
cution to present sufficient evidence to allow the Chamber to be convinced of genocidal 
intent beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
21 See id. ¶ 86. 
22 See Prosecution Document in Support of Appeal Against the “Decision on the Prose-
cution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest Against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir” 
¶¶ 19–26, Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05–01/09 OA 
( July 6, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc706618.pdf [hereinafter Support 
for Appeal]; Prosecution’s Application for Leave to Appeal the “Decision on the Prosecu-
tion’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest Against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir” ¶¶ 2–3, 
Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05–01/09 (Mar. 10, 2009), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc644001.pdf [hereinafter Leave to Appeal]. 
23 See Leave to Appeal, supra  note 22, ¶¶ 36–39. 
24 See Support for Appeal, supra  note 22, ¶¶ 44–49 (“This same Court has issued ar-
rest warrants based on inferences that the person acted with the relevant mens rea and 
without any requirement that they be the only reasonable inference.”). 
25 Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Al Bashir Appeal ), Case No. ICC-02/ 
05–01/09, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the “Decision on the Prose-
cution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest Against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir,” ¶ 41 
(Feb. 3, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc817795.pdf. 
26 See id. ¶ 33 (“If the only reasonable conclusion based on the evidence is the exis-
tence of genocidal intent, then it cannot be said that such a finding establishes merely 
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conclusion” standard put forth by the Pre-Trial Chamber “amounts to 
requiring the Prosecutor to disprove any other reasonable conclusions 
and to eliminate any reasonable doubt.”27 Finding such a standard to 
be more stringent than what is statutorily required, the Appeals Cham-
ber reversed the Pre-Trial Chamber to the extent that it applied such a 
standard to the genocide allegations.28 
 The Appeals Chamber, however, declined the Prosecution’s invita-
tion to order the Pre-Trial Chamber to issue an arrest warrant for the 
genocide charges, choosing instead to remand the case to the Pre-Trial 
Chamber for redetermination under the correct standard of proof.29 
On July 12, 2010, the Pre-Trial Chamber issued a second arrest warrant 
against Al Bashir for three counts of genocide.30 This is the first time 
the ICC issued an arrest warrant for charges of genocide.31 The deci-
sion was greeted with both praise and condemnation, and Al Bashir 
continues to defy the arrest warrants today.32 
II. Discussion 
A. Genocide and International Criminal Tribunals 
 The United Nations General Assembly originally defined genocide 
in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide.33 The definition provided by the General Assembly 
                                                                                                                      
‘reasonable grounds to believe.’ Rather, it establishes genocidal intent ‘beyond reasonable 
doubt.’”). 
27 See id. 
28 See id. ¶ 41. 
29 Id. ¶ 42. 
30 Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05–01/09, Second 
Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 9 ( July 12, 2010), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc907140.pdf. 
31 See Sudan’s President Omar Al-Bashir Charged with Three Counts of Genocide in Darfur, Tele-
graph (London) ( July 12, 2010), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaand 
indianocean/sudan/7886123/Sudans-President-Omar-al-Bashir-charged-with-three-counts-of-
genocide-in-Darfur.html. 
32 See Mackenzie et al., supra note 7, at 182; Sudan’s President Omar Al-Bashir Charged 
with Three Counts of Genocide in Darfur, supra note 31; Rice, supra note 2. 
33 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 
260 (III), U.N. Doc. A/Res/260(III) (Dec. 9, 1948) (“[G]enocide means any of the follow-
ing acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group, as such: (a) killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or 
mental harm to members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions 
of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing 
measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) forcibly transferring children of 
the group to another group.”). 
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has been adopted verbatim in the statutes governing the ICTY, the ICTR, 
and the ICC.34 Although the term colloquially refers to large-scale kill-
ings, the legal concept of genocide is reserved for a narrow subset of 
atrocities, which are characterized by an intent to destroy groups.35 De-
spite the fact that the definition of genocide has been accepted by the 
United Nations General Assembly, adopted by the Rome Statute, and 
adjudicated before ad hoc international criminal tribunals, the applica-
tion and interpretation of the definition continues to raise difficulties 
for adjudication.36 
B. The Evidentiary Standards of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the European 
Court of Human Rights 
 The statutorily prescribed standards of proof for the ICTY and 
ICTR are nearly identical.37 In order to confirm an indictment for-
warded by the prosecutor during the pre-trial stage in both the ICTY 
and ICTR, the judge must be “satisfied that a prima facie case has been 
established by the Prosecutor.”38 At the trial stage in both the ICTY and 
the ICTR, the majority of judges must be “satisfied that guilt has been 
proven beyond reasonable doubt” in order to find the accused guilty.39 
With respect to proof of genocidal intent at the trial stage, the ICTY 
ruled that such intent may be inferred from the factual circumstances 
of the crime, but that when such an inference is drawn, “it has to be the 
only reasonable inference available on the evidence.”40 
                                                                                                                      
34 See Robert Cryer et al., An Introduction to International Criminal Law 
and Procedure 202–04 (2d ed. 2010). 
35 See id. at 203. 
36 See id. at 204 (“Almost every word of this definition has raised difficulties of interpre-
tation.”). 
37 See S.C. Res. 955, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (adopting the Statute of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda as annexed to the Resolution); S.C. Res. 
827, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) (adopting the Statute of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia as annexed to the Resolution); see also Mack-
enzie et al., supra note 7, at 186. 
38 S.C. Res. 955, supra  note 37, Annex, art. 18(1); S.C. Res. 827, supra  note 37, Annex, 
art. 19(1). 
39 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwan-
da art. 87(a), adopted June 29, 1995 and amended through Oct. 1, 2009, http://www. 
unictr.org/Portals/0/English/Legal/ROP/100209.pdf; Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia art. 87(a), U.N. Doc. IT/ 
32/Rev. 44, adopted June 29, 1995 and amended through Dec. 10, 2009, http://www.icty. 
org/x/file/Legal/%20Library/Rule_procedure_evidence/IT032_rev44_en.pdf. 
40 Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99–36-T, Judgment, ¶ 970 (Sept. 1, 2004), http:// 
www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/tjug/en/brd-tj040901e.pdf. 
22 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review Vol. 34: E. Supp. 
 At the pre-trial stage before the ECHR, a person can be lawfully 
arrested or detained “for the purpose of bringing him before the com-
petent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an 
offence.”41 The ECHR has interpreted the “reasonable suspicion” stan-
dard by explaining that “facts which raise a suspicion need not be of the 
same level as those necessary to justify a conviction or even the bringing 
of a charge, which comes at the next stage of the process of criminal 
investigation.”42  The Appeals Chamber of the ICC specifically refer-
enced the ECHR for this distinction between progressively higher evi-
dentiary standards at distinct stages in proceedings before the court.43 
C. Evidentiary Standards in the Rome Statute 
 From the issuance of an arrest warrant to the conviction of the ac-
cused, the Rome Statute establishes three separate standards of proof 
for proceedings before the ICC.44 To issue an arrest warrant, the Pre-
Trial Chamber must be satisfied that “[t]here are reasonable grounds to 
believe that the person has committed a crime.”45 At this point in the 
proceedings, the accused has neither submitted a defense nor appeared 
before the ICC in any manner.46 After the surrender or voluntary ap-
pearance of the person charged, the Pre-Trial Chamber holds a hearing 
on the confirmation of charges in which the judges will determine 
whether there is “sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to 
believe that the person committed each of the crimes charged.”47 Dur-
ing the confirmation hearing, which is held in the presence of the ac-
cused and his or her counsel, the accused may “[o]bject to the charges” 
                                                                                                                      
41 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 
5(1)(c), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 2889 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953). 
42 Murray v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14310/88, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 193, 225 (1994). 
43 Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Al Bashir Appeal ), Case No. ICC-02/ 
05–01/09, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the “Decision on the Prosecu-
tion’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest Against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir,” ¶ 31 
(Feb. 3, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc817795.pdf (“Thus, at this preliminary 
stage, it does not have to be certain that the person committed the alleged offence. Certainty 
as to the commission of the crime is required only at the trial stage . . . when the Prosecutor 
has had a chance to submit more evidence.”). 
44 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra  note 8, arts. 58, 61, 66. 
45 Id. art. 58(a)(1). 
46 See id. arts. 54, 61. During the pre-trial investigation into potential violations of the 
Rome Statute, the Prosecutor can only request to speak with the accused; it is not until the 
accused has been arrested or voluntarily appeared before the ICC that he or she is able to 
formally object to the charges. Id. 
47 Id. art. 61(7). 
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and “[p]resent evidence.”48 Finally, after completing the trial, the Pre-
Trial Chamber may convict the accused only if it is “convinced of the 
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.”49 
III. Analysis 
 By citing to evidentiary standards of the ICTR, the ICTY, and the 
ECHR, among others, the Pre-Trial Chamber established itself well with-
in the boundaries of international legal precedent.50 It was, however, an 
imperfect fit, as evidenced by the Pre-Trial Chamber’s failure to distin-
guish its decision on two important levels: procedural and substantive.51 
Procedurally, as Judge Ušacka pointed out, most of the existing public 
jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR is drawn from the appellate and 
trial stages, not the pre-trial stage.52 The Majority was thus correct in 
understanding the “only reasonable conclusion” argument as the argu-
ment emanating from the ad hoc tribunals, but incorrect in conflating 
the final decisions of the tribunals with a pre-trial decision in the ICC.53 
At this stage in the proceedings, the Pre-Trial Chamber should be con-
cerned only with the question of “reasonable grounds to believe” that 
the accused committed the crime.54  To understand the standard of 
proof necessary for the issuance of an arrest warrant, the Appeals 
Chamber drew an apt analogy to a similar debate in the ECHR wherein 
the ECHR recognized that a standard of reasonable suspicion “presup-
poses the existence of facts or information which would satisfy an objec-
                                                                                                                      
48 Id. art. 61(6). 
49 Id. art. 66(3). 
50 See Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Al Bashir II ), Case No. ICC-02/05–
01/09, Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest Against Omar 
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ¶ 160 (Mar. 4, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc 
639096.pdf. 
51 See Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Al Bashir Appeal ), Case No. ICC-
02/05–01/09, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the “Decision on the Pros-
ecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest Against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir,” ¶ 19 
(Feb. 3, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc817795.pdf; Prosecutor v. Omar Has-
san Ahmad Al Bashir (Al Bashir III ), Case No. ICC-02/05–01/09, Decision on the Prosecu-
tion’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest Against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ¶ 6 (Mar. 
4, 2009) (Ušacka, J., separate and partly dissenting), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc 
639096.pdf. 
52 See Al Bashir III, Case No. ICC-02/05–01/09, ¶¶ 6, 10 (“[J]urisprudence of the ICTY 
and ICTR . . . is not directly applicable before this Court without ‘detailed analysis’, be-
cause of significant differences between the procedural frameworks of this Court and the 
ad hoc tribunals.”). 
53 See id. ¶¶ 28–29. 
54 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra  note 8, art. 58(1)(a). 
24 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review Vol. 34: E. Supp. 
tive observer that the person concerned may have committed the of-
fence.”55 
 The main problem regarding the failure of the ICC Pre-Trial 
Chamber to distinguish its decision procedurally from those of other 
international bodies is that the decision forecloses the opportunity for a 
trial on the merits, whatever the eventual judgment may be.56 Although 
at first blush a high threshold at the pre-trial stage may appear to favor 
the defense, the standard set by the Pre-Trial Chamber actually disad-
vantages the defense since arrest warrants are issued only on the infor-
mation provided by the Prosecutor; a defense is not even presented un-
til the hearing on the confirmation of charges.57 Similarly, the proce-
dure set forth by the Pre-Trial Chamber requires the Prosecutor to 
prove mens rea without having the opportunity to confront the accused 
at trial.58 This is of particular concern for genocide allegations in which 
intent is a critical, yet difficult to prove, component of the charge.59 Ac-
cordingly, as the Appeals Chamber emphasized, the standard of proof 
outlined by the Pre-Trial Chamber is actually more akin to the “beyond 
reasonable doubt” standard required for conviction.60 If the Prosecutor 
meets this standard, the defense would have to overcome a decision of 
beyond reasonable doubt, thus essentially rendering moot the confirma-
tion of charges stage because “beyond a reasonable doubt” is a higher 
threshold than “substantial grounds to believe.”61 Therefore, while a high 
threshold arguably weeds out unsupported charges by front-loading the 
evidentiary requirements, it then bypasses the statutorily prescribed sec-
                                                                                                                      
55 Fox, Campbell & Hartley v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 12244/86, 12245/86, 12383/ 
86, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 157, 167 (1990) (emphasis added); see Al Bashir Appeal, Case No. ICC-
02/05–01/09, ¶ 31. 
56 See Al Bashir Appeal, Case No. ICC-02/05–01/09, ¶¶ 30–31. 
57 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra  note 8, art. 58(1)(a) 
(“[T]he Pre-Trial Chamber shall, on the application of the Prosecutor, issue a warrant of ar-
rest.”) (emphasis added); see also id. art. 61(1) (“[W]ithin a reasonable time after the per-
son’s surrender or voluntary appearance before the Court, the Pre-Trial Chamber shall 
hold a hearing to confirm the charges. . . . The hearing shall be held in the presence of 
the Prosecutor and the person charged, as well as his or her counsel.”) (emphasis added). 
58 See id. arts. 58(1)(a), 61(1). 
59 See Al Bashir Appeal, Case No. ICC-02/05–01/09, ¶ 17; Al Bashir III, Case No. ICC-
02/05–01/09, ¶ 27; Support for Appeal, supra  note 22, ¶ 41; see also Rutaganda v. Prosecu-
tor, Case No. ICTR-96–3-A, Judgment, ¶ 525 (May 26, 2003), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/ 
0/Case/English/Rutaganda/decisions/030526.pdf (“In the absence of explicit, direct proof, 
the dolus specialis may therefore be inferred from relevant facts and circumstances. Such an 
approach prevents perpetrators from escaping convictions simply because such manifesta-
tions are absent.”) (footnotes omitted). 
60 See Al Bashir Appeal, Case No. ICC-02/05–01/09, ¶ 33. 
61 See id. ¶¶ 30–33. 
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ond stage and requires all parties to operate on the assumption that the 
case has already been proven beyond reasonable doubt.62 The failure of 
distinction procedurally between the ICC and other international bod-
ies thus confuses the three statutorily designated stages of proceedings 
before the ICC and paradoxically requires the highest standard of proof 
at the earliest stage of the proceedings, disadvantaging both the prose-
cution and the defense.63 
 Beyond simply procedural matters, the Pre-Trial Chamber failed to 
distinguish itself substantively as the permanent international criminal 
tribunal.64 While references to the ad hoc and other international bod-
ies are persuasive, they should not be predictive of outcomes before the 
ICC for two reasons: jurisdiction and permanence.65 First, apart from 
the ICTY and ICTR which are limited geographically to the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, respectively, the ICC is the only permanent in-
ternational criminal court having jurisdiction over individuals accused 
of genocide, war crimes, and/or crimes against humanity.66 Second, the 
ICC is the first, and only, permanent, independent international crimi-
nal adjudicatory body.67 In this regard, the Appeals Chamber decision 
is striking not simply because it reversed the Pre-Trial Chamber for an 
erroneous standard of proof, but also, more subtly, because it signaled 
the necessity for distinction between the ICC and other international 
bodies, particularly in regard to the standard of proof required to sat-
isfy the mens rea component of genocide.68 
 It is of note, in this respect, that the Appeals Chamber itself re-
fused to direct the Pre-Trial Chamber to issue a second arrest warrant 
for the crimes of genocide, noting that the substance of the matter 
should be decided by the Pre-Trial Chamber.69 In so doing, the Appeals 
                                                                                                                      
62 See id.; Leave to Appeal, supra  note 22, ¶ 39. 
63 See Leave to Appeal, supra  note 22, ¶¶ 38–39. 
64 See Al Bashir III, Case No. ICC-02/05–01/09, ¶¶ 4–10. 
65 See Mackenzie et al., supra  note 7, at 158–59. 
66 See id. at 157–59, 185. 
67 See id. at 159 (“A fundamental difference between the ICC and the ICTY/ICTR is 
that while the latter are subsidiary organs of the Security Council . . . the ICC is not a UN 
organ.”). The International Court of Justice, also cited by the Pre-Trial Chamber, is simi-
larly an organ of the United Nations and, further, allows only states to be parties in pro-
ceedings before the court. Id. at 4, 13. In the ECHR, individuals, non-governmental or-
ganizations, and Member States may file claims before the court, but they may do so only 
against Member States of the Council of Europe. Id. at 334–35. Further, claims brought 
before the ECHR are limited to alleged violations of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. Id. 
68 See Al Bashir Appeal, Case No. ICC-02/05–01/09, ¶¶ 30–33. 
69 See id. ¶ 42. 
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Chamber underscored the necessity of establishing detailed precedent 
for the Pre-Trial Chamber based not on the application of an eviden-
tiary standard similar to other legal bodies, but instead based on the 
application of the evidentiary standard of the Rome Statute.70 As the 
standard of analysis will likely serve as the basis for future genocide al-
legations before the ICC, a detailed opinion from the Pre-Trial Cham-
ber, rather than an order from the Appeals Chamber, better serves to 
establish legal norms for the ICC.71 
 As a relatively new international criminal adjudicatory body, the 
ICC will continue to face questions concerning both legitimacy and ef-
fectiveness.72 The decision of the Appeals Chamber bolsters the latter.73 
While the decision of the Appeals Chamber has neither curbed Al Ba-
shir’s continuing defiance to submit to the arrest warrants issued against 
him, nor answered jurisdictional critics, the decision has standardized 
procedural norms for future genocide allegations brought before the 
ICC.74 Further, the Appeals Chamber decision, followed by the issuance 
of a second arrest warrant, bolstered the effectiveness of the ICC by as-
serting its independence in the face of international pressure.75 By re-
versing the Pre-Trial Chamber, the Appeals Chamber established the 
procedural norms for the adjudication of genocide charges utilizing the 
statutorily defined, progressively stringent evidentiary thresholds of the 
Rome Statute.76 Such standardization provides both the Prosecutor and 
the accused not only a stable procedural structure for the adjudication 
of genocide allegations, but also an effective framework in which to pre-
sent, and rebut, evidence before a neutral trier of fact.77 The progres-
sively higher stages of the proceedings thus ensure equity as the ICC 
seeks to “exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious 
crimes of international concern.”78 
                                                                                                                      
70 See id. 
71 See id.; Leave to Appeal, supra  note 22, ¶ 37. 
72 See Mackenzie et al., supra  note 7, at 181. 
73 See Al Bashir Appeal, Case No. ICC-02/05–01/09, ¶¶ 38–39. 
74 See id. ¶¶ 41–42. 
75 See Mackenzie et al., supra  note 7, at 182. 
76 See id. at 209 (“Both the ICTY and the ICTR further refined over the years their pro-
cedures, in a learning-by-doing process that provided the foundation for subsequent gen-
erations of international criminal bodies.”). 
77 See Leave to Appeal, supra  note 22, ¶¶ 36–39. 
78 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra  note 8, art. 1. 
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Conclusion 
 While the outcome of a trial against Al Bashir for genocide, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity remains uncertain, particularly in 
light of Al Bashir’s refusal to submit to the arrest warrants, what has 
emerged from the decision of the Appeals Chamber is a clear standard 
by which he, and future persons accused of such crimes, will be judged. 
The decision by the Appeals Chamber accomplished this goal by stabi-
lizing the procedural norms of the Pre-Trial Chamber, particularly 
when determining the mens rea element of genocide allegations. In ad-
dition, the decision asserts the ICC’s significance not only as an inde-
pendent body within its own right, but as the only permanent body 
charged with criminal adjudication of individuals accused of the most 
serious crimes of international concern. By reversing the judgment of 
the Pre-Trial Chamber, the Appeals Chamber bolstered the effective-
ness of the relatively new international adjudicatory body by placing it 
within international legal norms, but independent of any other inter-
national legal body. 
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